THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
Insurance-Sales Guaranty as a Contract of Insurance-[Ohio].-A mass distributor of private brand auto tires presented to each tire purchaser a guaranty
whereby the defendant agreed to repair or replace the tire should it fail within the
specified replacement period, without limit as to cause of failure (except fire and
theft). If replacement was made, the purchaser was charged a prorated share of the
purchase price for the use of the old tire. In a quo warranto proceeding to oust the defendant from engaging in the business of insurance, held, judgment of ouster should
issue. This was a contract substantially amounting to insurance and within provisions of the statute requiring insurance companies to comply with state laws regu2
lating the business of insurance., State ex rel. Duffy v. Western Auto Supply Co.
Since the use of this blanket type of guaranty is widespread it seems probable that
similar actions may be brought in other states.3 Although the technical wording of
the Ohio statute is broad enough to justify the court's conclusion that this is a contract substantially amounting to insurance, it seems very unlikely that the act was
intended to be used in such a manner, i.e., in effect, to control competitive merchandising practices.4
The business of insurance has been universally recognized as being impressed with
a public use and as such subject to state regulation and supervision.s The ease with
which policy holders might be defrauded by financially irresponsible or unreliable companies makes imperative the regulation of insurance by the state. Thus, there are
statutes which provide for close supervision of the activities of insurance companies
to assure the careful and proper handling and distribution of the premiums that have
been paid into the fund from which the benefits must ultimately come. In the sales
cases, the buyer has received his quid pro quo and the necessity of safeguarding a reserve is not so strong. These laws were primarily meant to discourage so-called
benefit-associations which were engaging in the insurance business and seeking to
escape state regulation. 6
The defendant claimed that its agreement to indemnify the buyer was simply a
warranty of quality which was adopted because it was found that this arrangement
served as the most satisfactory, inexpensive and convenient method of adjusting customers' complaints, since the average motorist feels that every tire failure is due to an
inherent defect.7
A warranty is an affirmation of fact or a promise by the seller concerning an article
of sale, which is meant to induce the sale, and upon which the buyer has a right to
rely.8 Even the simplest warranty, which could not possibly be construed as an insurance contract, protects the vendee against risk of loss after title has passed, which
2i6 N.E. (2d) 256 (Ohio 1938).
x Ohio Gen'l Code, § 665.
3 The wording of the statutes is controlling, of course, and in many states may serve as a
means of distinguishing the principle case as a precedent. For examples of statutory interpretations in analogous situations see: Pennsylvania v. Provident Bicycle Ass'n, 178 Pa. 636, 36
Ad. 197 (I897); Ollendorf Watch Co. v. Pink, 253 App. Div. 73, 30 N.Y. Supp. 1x75 (1937).
4Tire manufacturers had a direct interest in the decision, since the use of this guaranty is
said to have cost them $io,ooo,ooo a year. Advertising Age, July z8, 1938, 8.
s Fidelity Mutual Life Ass'n v. Mettler, 185 U.S. 308 (I902).
6
Vance, Insurance 29 (2d ed. i93o).
7 See Advertising Age, July i8, 1938, 8, commenting on the principal case.
8
Uniform Sales Act, § I2.

RECENT CASES
risk, without this protection, would have passed to the vendee. The Ohio insurance
statute does not define insurance, but it is reasonable to suppose that it was never intended to prohibit vendors from warranting the goods which they sell.
The court apparently felt that this guaranty was not a warranty because, as it
says, "A warranty promises indemnity against defects in the article sold, while insurance indemnifies against loss or damage resulting from perils outside of and unrelated
to defects in the article itself."9 No authorities are cited in support of this proposition."° In a similar case involving an agreement by the seller to indemnify the buyer
against all losses caused by failure of the article sold (lightning rod), the court says,
".... so may one sell goods and agree that the purchaser will receive certain benefits ..... Such a contract would be a guaranty or warranty and not a contract of
insurance.""t
Various tests to determine whether particular agreements to indemnify are warranties or contracts of insurance have been suggested.12 A number of cases state that in
order to have a contract of insurance, the extent to which the insurer will be liable
must be specific, i.e., there must be an agreement to pay either a maximum or ascertainable sum on a specified contingency.' 3 An often cited Pennsylvania opinion4 says
that an agreement to "repair or replace" is not the generally accepted practice of
insurance, and although an insurance company could issue such a policy, it does not
logically follow that every company which agrees to "repair or replace" its products
if they fail is engaged in the insurance business as it is ordinarily regarded and carried
on in practice. Still other cases s state that such warranties cannot be contracts of
insurance since they lack an essential feature of that kind of contract, namely, a
premium, and that where no premiums have been paid and no fund exists or is contemplated by the parties, there is no reason for regulation or supervision. There is no
evidence in these cases that the warranties entailed an increase in price in consideration thereof. 16 Most likely they are a means of advertising so as to promote good
will and increase sales for which the vendor receives no additional consideration.
Immunity from the operation of the insurance laws has been granted by the courts
in cases where associations in return for annual premiums agree to repair and replace
9 P. 259.

xoBut see General Motors Truck Co. v. Shepard Co., 47 R.I. 88, 97,

X29

Atl. 825, 829

(agreement by seller of trucks to repair free of charge for one year held express warranty
under the Uniform Sales Act); contra, Wall v. Britton Stevens Motors Co., 251 Mass. 517,
146 N.E. 693 (1925) (agreement to replace defective parts free of charge for ninety days held
not a warranty). See also Bogert, Express Warranties in the Law of Sales, 33 Yale L.J. 14
(1925)

(1923).

"Cole Bros. & Hart v. Haven, 7 N.W. 383 (Iowa 188o).
See 3 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 250 (937).
'3 United States v. Home Title Ins. Co., 285 U.S. 191 (1932); Bankers' Health &Life Ins.
Co. v. Knott, 4 Ga. App. 639, 154 S.E. 194 (1930).
'4 Pennsylvania v. Provident Bicycle Ass'n, 178 Pa. 636, 36 Atl. 197 (1897).
isOllendorf Watch Co. v. Pink, 253 App. Div. 73, 3 o N.Y. Supp. 1175 (1937); Evans &
Tate v. Premier Refining Co., 31 Ga. App. 303, 120 S.E. 553 (1923). See Vance, op. cit. supra
note 6, at p. 5.
16 But see Chrysler Sales Corp. v. Smith, 9 F. (2d) 666 (D.C. Wis. 1925); Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917). See also Vance, op. cit. supra note i, at 6o ft.
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plate glass windows,'7 or bicycles and bicycle tires stolen or damaged, regardless of
cause, 8 or to defend physicians against malpractice suits for a specified period.9
The Ohio court in its solicitous attempt to protect the public from unregulated
insurance practice, seems to have carried the intent of the insurance statutes beyond
the bounds which the legislation was intended to cover. If unfair competition results
from the use of unconditional guaranties, remedial acts may be passed by the legisla20

ture.

Practice-Power of Municipal Court To Prescribe Service of Process-[Illinois].Original summons and three alias summons were issued from the Municipal Court of
Chicago against the defendant. All were returned "not found," an employee at the
defendant's place of business reporting in each instance that the defendant was not in.
The court then directed service by delivering the summons to an employee at the
defendant's place of business, and by mailing a copy of the summons to the defendant.
An Illinois statute' provides that a majority of the judges of the Municipal Court of
Chicago shall have power to make rules regulating "practice" in that court. Rule
ioA2 of that court in turn provides that "in any case in which an officer is unable
from any cause to make due service of summons, the court ....may direct such
service to be made in such manner as the court shall deem proper." Judgment was
taken against the defendant by default. The lower court overruled a motion to quash
the summons and vacate the judgment. On appeal, held, reversed. The power to direct the manner of service of summons was not included in the power granted to make
rules of practice. Moreover, the legislature had delegated to a majority of the judges
power to make rules of practice, where as Rule ioA conferred that power upon a
single judge. Danoff v. Larson.3
The case is an interesting one because, while Rule ioA was probably invalid, the
grounds on which the decision is placed may foreclose future legitimate action by the
Municipal Court. It has been held that the legislature may delegate to the courts
power to make their own rules of practice.4 The statutes granting to the Municipal
Court power to make its own rules of practice would seem to have been passed with
the object of giving that court power to deal adequately with its peculiar municipal
problems. 6 On the other hand, it is unlikely that the legislature contemplated delegation to a single judge of unlimited discretionary powers as to what would be proper
17Moresh v. O'Regan, i2o N.J. Eq. 534, 187 AUt. 61g (i936).
18Pennsylvania v. Provident Bicycle Co., 178 Pa. 636, 36 At. 197 (1897).
'9

State v. Laylin,
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Ohio St. 9o, 76 N.E. 567 (195o).

20In interstate commerce the use of warranties which are in effect misrepresentations maybe

prevented by the Federal Trade Commission. 38 Stat. 717 (1914) § s; x5 U.S.C.A. § 45 (i938).
xIll. Rev. St., I937, c. 37, § 375.
2 Rule roA, Revised Civil Practice Rules of the Municipal Court (i935).
3 i5 N.E. (2d) 290 (Ill.
1938).
4 Hopkins v. Levandowski, 250 Ill.
372, 95 N.E. 496 (i9ii).
s Ill. Rev. Stat., 1937, c. 37, § 375.
6 The rules of practice of the Illinois Civil Practice Act do not apply to the Municipal
Court. Ptacek v. Coleman, 364 Ill.
618, 5 N.E. (2d) 467 (1936); Barry v. Knight, i N.E.
(2d) 999 (Ill. App. 1938).

